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Article 14

ENFORCEMENT IN A NEW AGE: JUDGMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND MEXICO
MATTHEW H. ADLER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Enforcement means "getting the money." It is the most important
part of any case, but is usually the most overlooked. Lawyers spend
most of their time and their clients' money trying to win the case, and
usually give little thought as to whether, if successful, the pot of gold
will be at the end of the rainbow.
If the litigation is domestic, then assuming a solvent opponent, this
confidence is usually justified, for at least four reasons:
1. The United States Constitution guarantees full faith and credit
to the judgments rendered by the several states, so that the courts
of one state are bound by the Constitution to recognize the
judgments of a sister state;'
2. Most of recognition and enforcement is based on a legal doctrine
called comity, which is essentially a lawyer's word meaning mutual
respect. It is easier for a state in the United States or Mexico
to grant comity to a sister state, with whom it shares essentially
the same legal system, than for one country to grant comity to
another country, separated by miles, legal system, language, culture
and politics;
3. Many states, including the border states of California and Texas,
have made it much easier to enforce judgments by enacting a
law called the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act,' which
obligates a state to execute upon the assets of one found liable
under another state's judgment; and
4. Most important, it is usually both easier and cheaper to find
assets located domestically than overseas. Therefore, a delinquent
defendant will generally have more trouble hiding and sheltering
his bank account in New York City than in Mexico City.
But if your opponent's assets are located abroad, you may have just
spent three years of litigation, twenty depositions of your senior staff,
and more fees than you care to think about having won nothing more
than a piece of paper. At the very least, you will have to engage in an
entirely new series of legal steps, this time in a foreign court.
Since, increasingly, business disputes are transnational, this absence of
rules stands out as a glaring vacuum. From the particular standpoint of
* Mr. Adler (B.S. Cornell, 1980; J.D. Columbia, 1983) is a partner in the Philadelphia Office
of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, specializing in domestic and international commercial litigation.
Mr. Adler is a member of the Study Group on Judgments of the Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private International Law. The opinions herein are solely those of the author.
1. U.S. CoNST., art. IV, § 1.
2. UNIFORM Fo iGN MONEY-JUDGMENTs ACT, 13 U,L.A. 261 (1986) § 4.
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the United States and Mexico, there are no rules. In a relationship
governed by dozens of treaties on a myriad of subjects, enforcement is
not addressed. Nor does Mexico stand alone. The United States has no
judgment enforcement treaty with any country. Nor, to compound the
problem, is there anything approaching a multi-national pact on the
subject. (There are regional treaties, as discussed below, but these are
not relevant to the U.S.-Mexico arena).'
International lawyers may abhor a vacuum even more than does nature,
and so, for the past several years, the United States has stood at the
forefront of an effort to introduce some set of order to this chaos. As
described below, these efforts face serious obstacles and will require
difficult policy decisions involving accommodations among competing
interests. The effort, however, is welcome, and the need is clear.
THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT OF JUDGMENT
ENFORCEMENT
Presently, enforcement of judgments between the United States and
other countries, including Mexico, takes place on an ad hoc basis. The
decision on whether to enforce a judgment is not only up to the individual
judge in the enforcing country, but takes place in the absence of clear
rules.
II.

A.

Arbitration
Let us detour for a moment into arbitration, which increasingly is a
dispute resolution instrument of choice among companies transacting
business across borders. There, the rules are precise and are established
by treaty. This is because transactional enforcement arbitration is governed
by a single treaty, commonly known as the New York Convention.4 The
New York Convention is signed by the overwhelming majority of industrialized nations. As a consequence, it is easier to enforce an arbitration
rendered by private parties than it is to enforce a judgment rendered
through the courts of a sister country. As long as the parameters of the
treaty are met, enforcement should, and usually does, follow.
B. Enforcement Abroad of Judgments Rendered in the U.S.
The absence of a treaty between any Latin country and the United
States on judgment enforcement means that there are no hard and fast

3. There are, for example, at least three intra-Latin treaties governing judgment enforcement
across Latin borders. See, e.g., Convention on Private International Law [hereinafter Bustamante
Code], promulgated as the Final Act of the Sixth International Conference of American States,
Feb. 20, 1928, reprinted in F. Garcia-Amador, The Inter-American System 398-435 (1987); InterAmerican
Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979,
OEA/Ser. A.28 (SEPF), 18 I.L.M. 1224 (1979) [hereinafter Mofitevideo Convention]; Inter-American
Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign
Judgments, May 24, 1984, OEA/Ser. A/39 (SEPF), 24 I.L.M. 468 (1985) [hereinafter La Paz
Convention].
4. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3
U.S.T. 2517, codified in 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 1997) [hereinafter New York Convention].
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rules in this area. Again, there is nothing unique in the legal landscape
about the absence of a U.S.-Mexican treaty; in the late 1970's, the United
States tried to negotiate a judgments treaty with the United Kingdom,
but the effort failed due to the political pressure exerted in the United
Kingdom by the British insurance industry, which was less than enthusiastic
about having to pay based on high United States jury awards. 5 That the
United States could not even negotiate a bilateral convention, with the
one country with which it shares both language and a common law
system, speaks worlds about the lack of popularity of U.S. judgments
abroad.
Why is this? Two reasons: jury awards and treble damages. U.S. jury
awards are by far the highest of any nation's. There are provisions in
U.S. law that let a jury make awards far in excess of the pecuniary
loss; once a jury is allowed to assess punitive damages or pain and
suffering costs, the sky is the limit. We read about those verdicts and
shake our heads. Foreign government leaders and lawyers read about
those verdicts and say "we will not buy into that system."
Nor is the perceived excess limited to products liability cases. In the
commercial law area, U.S. law permits punitive damages in securities
cases and treble damages in antitrust cases. Both securities and antitrust
enforcement in the United States have expanded in recent years to overseas
activities, leading to a still further perceived risk by other countries.
These fears do not result in an outright refusal to enforce U.S. judgments. They have, however, caused a great reluctance to enter into a
treaty with the United States. The result is a middle ground between
outright refusal and the almost unyielding acceptance that we see in
enforcement of arbitration awards. A foreign court asked to enforce a
U.S. judgment will lift up the hood of the car and inspect what is
underneath. The formal name for this process throughout Latin America6
is exequdtur [exequatur], or, in Mexico, homologac(on [homologation].
Depending on the particular country involved, the exequatur process
involves an examination by the enforcing court of a number of factors,
including the following:
1. Jurisdiction: Did the rendering court have jurisdiction over the
defendant?
2. Competence: Was the rendering court competent to hear this
dispute? Some courts will turn this into a subject matter jurisdiction inquiry.

5. Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters,
initialed October 26, 1976, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 71 (1977). See also Hans Smit, The Proposed
United States-United Kingdom Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A
Prototype for the Future?, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 443 (1977); Peter Hay & Robert J. Walker, The
Proposed U.S.-U.K. Recognition of Judgments Convention: Another Perspective, 18 VA. J. INT'L
L. 75 (1978).
6. See Amado, Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments in Latin American Countries:
An Overview and Update, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 99 (1990); Larsen, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Latin America: Trends and Differences, 17 TEx. INT'L L.J. 213 (1982) (for helpful summaries
of the exequdtur process in a number of Latin American countries).
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Due Process: Was the defendant personally served notice of the
proceeding? Did he have a fair opportunity to defend?

If we stopped here, there would be nothing inherently difficult about
the enforcement process. Most U.S. judgments could easily satisfy all of
these tests, especially because all must be met even before the U.S.
judgement is rendered. Before they leave the confines of U.S. courts,
defendants have the opportunity to argue that they were never served,
or that the court did not have jurisdiction, or that the court below did
not afford them a full and fair opportunity to present evidence, and
U.S. courts have proven themselves sympathetic to all of these arguments
where the facts so warrant.
There are, however, further tests imposed by other states, and Mexico's
are among the most stringent. Mexico requires that the judgment be
rendered according to rules of jurisdiction compatible with Mexican law;
the enforced obligation is not contrary to Mexican public policy; the
judgment does not result from an in rem action. This means that the
defendant, not just the defendant's property, must be present in the
rendering state. In addition, the judgment does not result from an action
which is subject to pending litigation between the same parties in a
Mexican court, even if the Mexican litigation was filed after the U.S.
litigation. 7 This, of course, leaves open the possibility that a litigant faced
with a loss in the United States, and upcoming enforcement of that loss
in Mexico, can file a case in Mexico, perhaps years after the U.S. case
was filed, and thereby block enforcement as a matter of law.
The public policy requirement has striking implications. Certainly, there
is room for some form of public policy exception in enforcement; if,
for example, a court ordered that a defendant's hand be severed where
it was found delinquent on a contract obligation, we would expect the
enforcing court to decline to carry out this order based on public policy
grounds.
But assuming a less draconian remedy, the public policy exception
means that a defendant doing business in the United States, if it can
insulate its assets outside of the United States, can export its own legal
system for purposes of enforcement.8 That is, whatever relief a U.S.
court might order against a defendant, the award will be meaningless
unless that remedy is also acceptable on the defendant's home turf. This
runs counter to U.S. notions of expansive personal jurisdiction, although
the U.S. Supreme Court has, in recent years, attempted to limit that
expansion in international cases. 9 As a consequence, the ability to enforce
more novel, uniquely-based U.S. judgments is not something that should

7. "C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal," art. 571 D.O. 26 de marzo de 1926 (effective Oct.
10, 1932, as amended).
8. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (for the use of the
public policy exception as a tool in limiting grounds of enforcement); Ronald Brand, Public Policy

and Enforcement of Judgments, 18 NETH. INT'L L. RaV. 143 (1996).
9. Id.
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be assumed. This may even continue to extend to investment dispute
judgments, based on whether the Calvo Clause remains strong. 10
C.

Latin Judgments in U.S. Courts
Many of the above comments run both ways. Because the U.S. does

not have a judgments enforcement treaty with any nation, U.S.
are free to inquire into the legitimacy of the rendering foreign
award. But, according to many observers over the years, they
do so." Rather, the overwhelming characteristic of U.S. courts is

courts
court's
do not
to give

effect to foreign judgments."t
The reason for this trend is that U.S. courts look less closely. The
U.S. basis for inquiry of foreign judgments is much more sharply limited

than the basis applied by other countries to U.S. judgments.
This attitude has historical roots. The seminal American foreign judg-

ment recognition case was an 1895 U.S. Supreme Court decision.

In

Hilton, a French citizen obtained a judgment in a French court against
an American defendant who was conducting business in France. The

10. Historically, Latin countries would refuse to recognize awards secured by investors who
contested expropriations. This refusal extended to arbitrations as well as to court judgments, and
was known as the "Calvo Clause," after the Argentine diplomat and jurist Carlos Calvo (18241906). The Calvo Clause was essentially an escape clause which provided that expropriation actions
had to be brought in the Latin courts to be recognized. Because this rendered diplomatic protection
of investors next to impossible, the Calvo Clause proved to be both controversial and a hindrance
to foreign investment. Recent investment treaties, including NAFTA and the U.S.-Venezuela Bilateral
Investment Treaty, appear to find it out of favor. See Daly, Has Mexico Crossed the Border on
State Responsibility for Economic Injury to Aliens? Foreign Investment and the Calvo Clause in
Mexico After NAFTA, 25 ST. MARY's L.J. 1147, 1162-63 (1994); Mason, The Corporate Counsel's
View: International Commercial Arbitration, 49-JuN Disp. REsOL. J. 22, 23 (1994).
11. See M. Adler, If We Build It, Will they Come? The Need For a Multilateral Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary Judgments, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
79 (1994); R. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Monetary Judgments in the United States: In Search
of Uniformity and InternationalAcceptance, 67 NoTRE DAmE L. REV. 253 (1991); A. von Mehren
& D. Trautman, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and A Suggested
Approach, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1601, (1968).
12. An illustrative, but by no means inclusive, list of such cases is: See generally Ingersoll Milling
Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987) (Belgian labor dispute judgment); Ackerman
v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986) (German contract judgment); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d
862 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Israeli contract judgment); Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612 F.2d 467 (9th
Cir. 1980) (Canadian guarantee judgment); National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. People's
Republic of the Congo, 729 F.Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (British loan judgment); Chase Manhattan
Bank NA. v. Hoffman, 665 F.Supp. 73 (D. Mass. 1987) (Belgian bankruptcy judgment); South
Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Westpac Banking Corp., 678 F.Supp. 596 (D.S.C 1987); Parsons v. Bank
Leumi Le-Israel, 565 So. 2d 20 (Ala. 1990) (Israeli loan guarantee judgment); Panama Processes
S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1990) (Brazilian contract judgment); Bullen v. Her
Majesty's Gov't of the U.K., 553 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. App. 1989) (British tax evasion judgment);
Bank of Nova Scotia v. Tschabold Equip. Ltd., 51 Wash. App. 749, 754 P.2d 1290 (1988) (Canadian
bad check judgment); Laufer v. Westminster Brokers Ltd., 532 A.2d 130 (D.C. 1987) (British
brokerage contract judgment); Overseas Dev. v. Nothman, 115 AD. 927, 496 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1985)
(British money judgment); Porsini v. Petricca, 90 A.D. 949, 456 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1982); Mercandino
v. Devoe & Reynolds, Inc., 181 N.J. Super., 436 A.2d 942 (App. Div. 1981) (Italian default
judgment); Medical Arts Bldg. Ltd. v. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d 241 (N.D. 1980) (Canadian landlordtenant judgment); Feuchter v. Bazruto, 22 Ariz. App. 427, 528 P.2d 178 (1974) (Mexican bad check
judgment).
13. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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plaintiff then filed a petition for recognition and enforcement in the
appellate court, which granted the petition. The defendant appealed to
the Supreme Court, which by a narrow margin (5-4), reversed the Circuit
Court's grant
of recognition, basing its decision on the doctrine of
4
reciprocity .
Although the explicit holding in Hilton on reciprocity has been rejected,
the Hilton dictum continues to influence modern recognition practice in
the United States. Hilton held that before a foreign judgment is recognized,
the plaintiff must establish that the court rendering the judgment met
the following criterion:
1. subject matter jurisdiction;
2. jurisdiction over the parties or the res; and
3. timely and proper notice of the proceedings; and an opportunity
to present a defense to an unbiased tribunai."
Most jurisdictions in the United States adopted these requirements almost
verbatim, and Hilton remains the predominant statement of the American
approach to foreign-country judgment recognition. 16 However, there remains a lack of a single uniform approach. 7
Perhaps more important than outlining the prerequisites to recognizing
foreign judgments in United States Courts, Hilton clarified the doctrine
of comity. According to the Hilton court, comity is
[n]either a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive
or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. 8
Comity, as defined in Hilton, is a concept which survives to this day
in enforcement jurisprudence.' 9 U.S. courts pay lip service to comity;
but in truth, they usually grant enforcement whether or not they satisfy
themselves that the other country enforces U.S. court judgments.

14. Id. at 227-28. Under the doctrine of reciprocity a foreign judgment will not be afforded
recognition unless the rendering jurisdiction guarantees recognition of a similar judgment rendered
in the requested jurisdiction. See Bishop & Burnette, United States PracticeConcerning the Recognition
of Foreign Judgments, 24 INT'L LAW. 425 (1982); The Reciprocity Rule and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 327 (1977).

15. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 204-05; Bishop & Burnette, supra note 14.
16. Hilton, 159 U.S. 113; RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELI~ONS LAW OF THE UNrrED
STATES §§ 481-82 (1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, cmt. (West Supp.
1988).
17. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Monetary Judgments in the United States: In Search of
Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTaE DAw L. Rav. 253 (1991).
18. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64; Zaphiriou, Transnational Recognition and Enforcement of Civil
Judgments, 53 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 734 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Serv., 773 F.2d 452, (2d Cir. 1985); Somportex
Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017
(1972); Bishop & Burnette, supra note 14.
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D. Enforcement of Intra-Latin American Judgments in Latin America
Our last area, intra-Latin judgments, is governed by several treaties.
As in Western Europe, the Latin countries are party to a number of
treaties on enforcement.20 The principal treaties are the La Paz Convention, the Bustamante Code, and the Montevideo Convention. Mexico is
party to two of these, and, in fact, is the only country to have ratified
one of them.
The Bustamante Code, known more fully as the 1928 Pan American
Code of Private International Law, is subscribed to by the following
countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama,
Peru and Venezuela.' It provides that a judgment rendered in one
contracting state would have force in another if:
1. The rendering court was competent;
2. The parties were served;
3. The judgment does not conflict with the public policy of the
enforcing state;
4. The judgment is officially translated; and
5. The judgment is authentic in the State in which it was rendered
(i.e. was published, etc.).
One commentator has correctly pointed out that "the major weakness
of the Bustamante Code was that it deferred excessively to the local
interests of the State addressed." 2 2 Consequently, in 1979, a number of
Latin countries ratified the Montevideo Convention. 21 Its criteria for
enforcement are:
1. The foreign judgment must be authentic where rendered;
2. The judgment must be translated;
3. The judgment must be duly legalized in accordance with the law
of the State addressed;
4. The judge or tribunal rendering the judgment must be competent
in the international sphere to try the matter and to pass judgment
on it in accordance with the law of the state addressed;
5. The defending parties had notice and opportunity to be heard;
6. The judgment is final and has the force of res judicata in the
State of origin; and
7. The judgment is not manifestly contrary to the principles and
laws of the public policy of the State addressed.

20. The European treaties are popularly referred to as the "Lugano Convention," 28 I.L.M.
623 (1989), and the Brussels convention, formally known as the Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, reprinted in 3
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 6003.
21. M. BoWMAN & D. H ARis, MULTiLATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS, Treaty
113 (1984 & Supp. 1993). Signatories to the Bustamonte Code are Argentina, Columbia, Mexico,
Paraguay and Uruguay.
22. Amado, supra note 6, at 105.
23. The Montevideo Convention has been ratified by Argentina, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Congressional ratification is pending in Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Panama.
Organization of American States, supra note 3, at 23.
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Mexico also stands alone in being the only country which has ratified
the La Paz Convention, although there are other signatories.2 4 It is
primarily devoted to elaborating the meaning of the phrase "competent
in the international sphere" under the Montevideo Convention. 25 It establishes a set list of criteria for how to find that the rendering court
had jurisdiction. For corporate purposes, jurisdiction will be found either
where the corporation is domiciled or has its principle place of business
in the host state, or when the activities giving rise to the suit were
performed in the host state. There is also a savings clause: jurisdiction
will be assumed where the rendering court assumed jurisdiction in order
to avoid a denial of justice because
of the absence of a competent judicial
26
or other adjudicatory authority.
The significance of the intra-Latin treaties for purposes of the present
discussion is to show that there is nothing inherent about this subject
that bars its treatment under treaty. However, a second conclusion may
also emerge to the less optimistic among us: the potential success of a
treaty may be directly proportional to the similarities of the legal systems
of the compacting parties. Even more so, perhaps, than with trade pacts,
judgment enforcement may be successful only at the regional level. To
date, this is more than a hypothesis, as witness the regional (European
and Latin American) but not multinational agreements on this subject.
III.

THE CURRENT EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE
A JUDGMENTS TREATY

A.

The Hague Conference
The striking differences discussed here between enforcement of court
judgments and enforcement of arbitral awards have not been lost on the
international community. Over the past two decades, there have been
great strides in the international community on cooperation in other areas
of litigation. We now have treaties in the two areas where litigation has
its start: service of process, and discovery.2 7 To some it therefore makes
sense that there be a similar treaty on the process needed to bring litigation
to a close execution.
Given the problems U.S. judgments apparently encounter abroad, it
should come as no surprise that it is the United States that is leading
the effort to have a judgments convention. There is a group of government
lawyers that meets under the auspices of an organization known as the
Hague Conference on International Law. On May 5, 1992, the United

24. Other signatories are Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti,
Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Organization of American States, supra note 23, at 26.
25. For further discussion of this point, see Amado, supra note 6, at 107-08.
26. La Paz Convention, supra note 3, art. 2.
27. Hague Convention on Service Abroad, opened for signature, November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T.
361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163; Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad,
opened for signature, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. no. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
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States proposed that the Hague Conference prepare a convention on the
recognition and enforcement of judgments. The proposal was discussed
at a June 1993 conference and, at the suggestion of the Secretary General
of the Hague Conference, a small Working Group was established to
review the U.S. proposal.2"
The Working Group issued its initial conclusions on the feasibility of
a judgment recognition treaty on November 19, 1992.29 The Working
Group is currently considering the project, primarily the issue of what
deference should be granted to the rendering court's jurisdiction. More
contentious issues, especially jury and treble damage awards, have yet
to be considered.
The Working Group presented its recommendations to the 17th Session
of the Hague Conference, which met on May 10-29, 1993. At a subsequent
meeting of the Hague Conference in June 1994, the issue was assigned
to a Special Commission.
Since then, there have been a number of further sessions of the
Commission. There are a number of additional meetings scheduled including a two-week session in June 1997, two two-week sessions in 1998,
and one two-week session in 1999. The process is expected to result, at
the present pace of negotiations, with the promulgation of a treaty in
the year 2000.
B.

Issues Before the Hague Conference
According to a State Department statement,
[t]he still somewhat tentative status of the project results from the
expressed concern that many issues to be dealt with in a convention
are complex and will require substantial give and take by the United
States and other countries. It is also attributable to the continuing
perception that this project is a U.S. proposal, and that the United
States should be prepared to concede on a number of matters in
order to obtain the advantage of recognition and enforcement of U.S.
judgments as a treaty- based entitlement. 0

At the outset of this process, the State Department offered its view
of the potential difficulty facing the U.S. in these negotiations: "the
feeling may persist that the United States has substantially more to gain
from a convention . . . than other states, the judgments of the courts
of which are, for the most part, already recognized and enforced by
courts in the United States."'"

28. The Working Group is composed of experts from Argentina, China, Egypt, Finland, France,
Hungary, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela.
29. Hague Conference on Private International Law (General Affairs), Conclusions of the Working
Group Meeting on Enforcement of Judgments, Preliminary Document No. 19 of November 1992

for the attention of the Seventeenth Session.
30. Memorandum from Peter F. Pfund, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law,
U.S. Dep't. of State, to Members of Study Group on Judgments of the Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private International Law (July 1, 1993) [hereinafter Pfund Memo] (copy on file
with author).
31. Pfund memo, supra note 30, at 2.
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In the United States, there is an expansive system of jurisdiction, that
often results in large damages awards. Either one of these events - a
large judgment, or one based on jurisdictional bases that in other countries
would be considered fleeting at best - can strike terror into the heart
of a foreign Justice Ministry. Taken together, they have led to great
caution by other nations in entering into a judgment pact, as witness
the failure of the U.S-U.K. judgment treaty discussed above.32
1. Jurisdiction
Any enforcement treaty must have a jurisdictional clause - that is,
a clause in the treaty that tests whether the rendering court actually had,
in the eyes of the court asked to enforce the judgment, proper jurisdiction
in the first place. Adjudicatory jurisdiction, as this is known, is one of
the most difficult issues in the enforcement arena." Initially, two approaches to this issue had developed. Under a convencton simple [single
convention], a judgment is enforced when it conforms to the enforcing
country's jurisdictional requirements. Under a convencon doble [double
convention], the parties enumerate, in advance, the jurisdictional grounds
on which a judgment will be entitled to recognition.3 4 Assuming, though,
that even with such a so-called white list of adjudicatory criteria in the
treaty, there will still be a threshold issue (as in every court) on jurisdiction.
The double convention approach leads to a jurisdictional test within a
jurisdictional test. The following are among the items one would expect to see in a white
list:
1. Finality - the judgment must be final in the rendering jurisdiction;
2. Subject matter jurisdiction must have existed in the rendering
court;

3. Personal jurisdiction over the parties or res must have existed;
and
4. Notice - the party against whom enforcement is sought must
have had timely and proper notice of the proceedings;
5. The party against whom enforcement is sought must have had
an opportunity to present a defense;
6. The rendering court must have been unbiased.
The rendering court's proceedings must have been regular and conducted
according to a system of civilized jurisprudence. 5

32. See text associated with note 31 above.
33. See, e.g., RUTH BADER GINSBURG, REcoomNION AND EXECUTION OF FOREIGN Civit JUDGMENTS
AND ARBTRATION AWARDS, N LEGAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA UNDER CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES 237,
243-44 (1970); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications:
A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARv. L. R~v. 1601, 1610 (1968); David L. Woodward,
ReciprocalRecognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments in the United States, the United Kingdom
and the European Economic Community, 8 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & CoM. REG. 299, 316 (1983); Kurt
H. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What to Do About
It, 42 IowA L. REV. 236, 260 (1956-57).
34. See generally Adler, supra note 11 at 96-98.
35. Id. at 97-98.
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One could simplify these issues still more: issues 1-3 above are pure
jurisdictional issues, while issues 4-7 are more in the lines of what we
would call due process. That is, first, was the court properly seized of
the matter and, if so, did the court conduct the proceedings fairly?
These, of course, are subjective issues. Not only is fairness perhaps
in the eyes of the beholder, but jurisdiction as well is a question that
differs depending on the vantage point. So-called tag jurisdiction, in
which a fleeting presence in a jurisdiction leads to a lawsuit, may prove
to be a more palatable doctrine in the United States, with large borders
that demand that persons be easily reached, than elsewhere.
A compromise approach that has developed is a convenc[on mixte
[mixed convention], in which controversial jurisdictional bases are placed
on a so-called grey list. 36 This approach has guided the United States'
position in early negotiating rounds at the Hague Conference, as a way
to negotiate a middle path between other countries' fears of excessive
United States jurisdictional concepts, and the United States' desire for
a wider reach. To date, however, there has been no progress toward this
compromise goal.
2.

Public Policy
Even a judgment rendered according to the most stringent standards
of personal contact with the forum, which came down only after a trial
that could not have been more fair or replete with opportunities for the
defendant to make his case, can be denied enforcement if it conflicts
with the public policy of the enforcing state. Here, the subject of high
jury awards, and the interrelated subject of punitive and treble damages,
must be confronted.
One solution is simply to leave an otherwise unspecific escape hatch
in the treaty, which will bar enforcement of a judgment where contrary
to "public policy." One could envision opposition to such a perhapsobvious judgment avoidance technique from, for example, the trial lawyers
lobby - but the rejoinder would be that something is considerably better
than the nothing which currently governs. To the extent that public policy
today would operate to bar enforcement in another country of a high
U.S. jury award, putting this into a treaty would not worsen the situation.
To the contrary, having a treaty would likely lead to a greater chance
of enforcement.
3.

Conclusions
It remains an unfortunate truth that litigation is a by-product of
contacts. The greater the number of such contacts, the greater the incidence
of litigation. It is by now a rather worn cliche that the world is getting
smaller and transnational contacts increasing, but the cliche is true, and
especially true for the United States and Mexico after NAFTA.

36. Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition Convention Study: Final Report to the U.S. Department
of State 28-29 (1992).
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It is the task of international lawyers to provide for some measure of
greater certainty and predictability in this new world. A judgments convention, therefore, is a very necessary step, and one which should not
be avoided simply because of the difficulties involved. Rather, those
difficulties flow from the very differences in national perspectives which
currently place enforcement efforts in jeopardy. They need to be accommodated and codified, not papered over.
For these reasons, the efforts by the State Department, and the Hague
Conference, are to be admired and supported. It is too early to speculate
about what might be the best position to take, but it would appear that
the proposal for a mixed convention, for example, is a welcome step at
compromise. Similar compromise efforts are to be expected regarding
public policy. Once a text emerges, it will be for those on the forefront
of international commerce

and

the

law, notably incligt-II

readers of

this Journal, to take up the challenge and ensure the success of the
effort.

